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Abstract: Both ancient sources and contemporary authors seem to agree, in 
general, that the Stoic disjunction was exclusive. The problem is that some 
ancient sources inform that the Stoics also considered disjunctions with more 
than two disjuncts and stated that such disjunctions were true if only one of 
their disjuncts was true as well. This appears to be a logical mistake, since an 
exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts can be true if its three disjuncts are 
true too. However, in this paper, I analyze this problem based on the mental 
models theory, and try to show that, under criteria different from those of stan-
dard logic, it is possible to claim that, in an exclusive disjunction with more 
than two disjuncts, only one disjunct can be true.
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Resumen: Tanto las fuentes antiguas como los autores contemporáneos pare-
cen estar de acuerdo, en general, en que la disyunción estoica era exclusiva. El 
problema es que algunas de las fuentes antiguas nos informan que los estoicos 
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también consideraron disyunciones con más de dos términos y que afirma-
ron que tales disyunciones eran verdaderas si solo uno de sus términos era 
igualmente verdadero. Esto parece ser un error lógico, pues una disyun-
ción exclusiva con tres términos puede ser verdadera si sus tres términos 
son también verdaderos. No obstante, en este trabajo, analizo el problema 
basándome en la teoría de los modelos mentales y trato de mostrar que, 
atendiendo a criterios diferentes a los de la lógica estándar, es posible 
plantear que, en una disyunción exclusiva con más de dos elementos, úni-
camente uno de ellos puede ser verdadero.
Palabras-clave: aridad; disyunción, modelos mentales; lógica estándar; 
lógica estoica
1. Introduction
Stoic logic seems to have a problem needing to be solved. That pro-
blem refers to the disjunction. On the one hand, both ancient sources and 
contemporary authors appear to indicate that the disjunction was essen-
tially exclusive for the Stoics. However, on the other hand, some ancient 
sources also state that the Stoics took disjunctions with more than two 
disjuncts into account and claimed that such disjunctions were true, as 
those with only two disjuncts, when only one of the disjuncts was true.
This is a problem because it appears to imply a logical mistake. In-
deed, a rigorous interpretation of the exclusive disjunction does not allow 
assuming that, when it has, for example, three disjuncts, such a disjunc-
tion is true only if one, and only one, of their disjuncts is true. In fact, an 
exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts can be true if its three disjuncts 
are all true.
Nevertheless, my thesis is that this problem arises because we as-
sess Stoic logic by means of standard logic, and it can easily be solved if 
we consider those two logics to be very different logics. In this way, I think 
that, if we analyze Stoic logic based on a contemporary reasoning theory, 
the mental models theory, it is possible to understand the real meaning 
of the Stoic disjunction, that that disjunction was not the disjunction of 
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classical logic, and the psychological reasons that could lead the Stoics to 
assume a disjunction of that kind.
All of this will be shown in this paper. Nonetheless, to do that, it 
seems to be opportune to begin by commenting the ancient sources that 
appear to present us the problem. After that, it will be explained why it is 
often thought that what those sources indicate is a problem. And, finally, 
the main theses of the mental models theory on the disjunction will be ex-
posed, and it will be accounted for how such theses enable to understand 
the actual sense of the Stoic disjunction and to remove the initial problem 
that the ancient sources seem to raise. I begin with the information provi-
ded by the sources.
2. The disjunction in the Stoicism
A very important point of Stoic logic is that the disjunction seems 
to be essentially exclusive in that logical system. Although at a certain 
moment the Stoics could accept an inclusive disjunction, the sources are 
very clear in this regard and show us that the basic disjunction in the 
Stoicism was the exclusive disjunction. As indicated by O’Toole and Jen-
nings,3 such sources include passages written by authors such as Cicero,4 
Gellius,5 Galen,6 Sextus Empiricus,7 and Diogenes Laërtius.8 However, as 
they also comment9, a number of modern authors, taking those passages 
into account, concluded that there was no doubt that the Stoic disjunc-
tion was mainly exclusive as well. Such authors are Bocheński,10 Kneale 
3. O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: “The Megarian and the Stoics” in Gab-
bay, M. D. & Woods, J.: Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume I. Greek, 
Indian and Arabic Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004, pp. 499-500.
4. Cicero: Topica, 14.56-7.
5. Gellius: Noctes Atticae, 16.8.
6. Galen: Institutio Logica, 5.1.
7. Sextus Empiricus: Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.191.
8. Diogenes Laërtius: Vitae Philosophorum 7.72.
9. O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: op. cit., pp. 498-499.
10. Bocheński, I. M.: Ancient Formal Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1963, p. 91.
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and Kneale,11 Lukasiewicz,12 Mates,13 and Mueller.14 In this regard, papers 
such as, for example, that of López-Astorga15 can also be very illustrative.
Nonetheless, the problem is that some of the ancient sources men-
tioned speak about disjunctions with more than two disjuncts. The parti-
cular passages are the following:
Gellius16 says,
Est item aliud, quod Graeci διεξευγμένον ἀξίωμα, nos ‘disiunctum’ dicimus. Id hui-
uscemodi est: ‘aut malum est voluptas aut bonum aut neque bonum neque malum 
est’. Omnia autem, quae disiunguntur, pugnantia esse inter sese oportet, eorumque 
opposita, quae ἀντικείμενα Graeci dicunt, ea quoque ipsa inter se adversa esse. Ex 
ominibus, quae disiunguntur, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.
That is, ‘there is another type named διεξευγμένον ἀξίωμα by the 
Greeks, named disjunction [disiunctum] by us. It is, for example, ‘plea-
sure is good or pleasure is evil or pleasure is neither good nor evil’. But 
these disjuncts must be all considered to be contradictory to each other, 
and their contraries, which are named ἀντικείμενα by the Greeks, must be 
considered to be contradictory too. Of all the disjuncts, only one should be 
true, and the others should be false.’
On the other hand, Galen17 states,
… τῶν διεξευγμένων εν μόνον ἐξόντων ἀληθές, ἄν τ’ ἔκ δυοῖν ἀξίωματων ἁπλῶν ἄν τ’ ἔκ 
πλειόνων συγκέηται.
11. Kneale, W. & Kneale, M.: The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon, 1962, p. 162.
12. Lukasiewicz, J.: “On the history of the logic of propositions” in McCall, S.: 
Polish Logic: 1920-1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 74.
13. Mates, B.: Stoic Logic. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1953, p. 51.
14. Mueller, I.: “An introduction to Stoic logic” in Rist, J. M.: The Stoics. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978, p. 16.
15. López-Astorga, M.: “Chrysippus’ indemonstrables and mental logic” in Croatian Journal 
of Philosophy 15(43), 2015, p. 7.
16. Gellius: op. cit., 16.8.
17. Galen: op. cit., 5.1.
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That is, ‘… disjunctions only have one true disjunct, whether they 
consist of only two propositions or of more of them.’
Finally, Sextus Empiricus18 claims,
τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεξευγμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ἒν τῷν ἔν αὐτῶ ὑγιές εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ 
ψεῦδος ἢ ψευδῆ μετὰ μάχης.
That is, ‘… with regard to sound disjunctions, states that one dis-
junct is sound, and the other disjunct or disjuncts is or are false, or false 
and opposed.’
Leaving aside the fact that Sextus Empiricus does not appear to 
distinguish between sound (ὑγιές) and true (ἀληθές) (for a discussion, see, 
e.g., Mates19 or O’Toole and Jennings20), it can be said that, based on the 
previous passages, it is obvious that, in Stoic logic, when an exclusive dis-
junction had more than two disjuncts, if that disjunction was true, only one 
of its disjuncts could be true. And this is a problem because, in principle, 
an exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts can be true if its disjuncts 
are all true, especially if standard logic is assumed. I explain this point in 
details in the next section. However, maybe a very relevant point needs to 
be highlighted before. These differences between Stoic and standard logic 
come from the fact that the former is based on complex ontological and 
metaphysical assumptions about reality and world, including clear ideas 
on what can be true and false at the same time. On the other hand, as 
known, the latter refers to the material interpretation of the conditional 
(which, ultimately, can be attributed to Philo of Megara21) and the formal 
relationships existing between this last connective and the other logical 
operators, disjunction being, of course, among them. The particular conse-
quences of all of this and why Stoic disjunction can be considered to cause 
difficulties related to arity can be noted below.
18. Sextus Empiricus: op. cit., 2.191.
19. Mates, B.: op. cit., p. 132.
20. O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: op. cit., p. 477.
21. See, e.g., ibidem, p. 479. References about this issue can be found there. In particular, 
O’Toole and Jennings mention texts such as, for example, Sextus Empiricus: op. cit., 2.110; 
Mates, B.: op. cit., p. 44; Bocheński, I. M.: op. cit., p. 89.
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3. The exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts
It is clear that, if I state a proposition such as ‘A or B but not both’, 
I mean that there are only two possibilities: i) A is true and B is false, or 
ii) A is false and B is true. My asseveration admits neither both of them 
being true nor both of them being false. The difficulty arises when the dis-
junction has more than two disjuncts and, at the same time, is intended 
to be exclusive. In this case, the structure of the proposition could be, for 
example, ‘either A or B or Γ’, and the problem can be noted more easily if 
we use symbols such as those of standard logic and consider the general 
requirements of this last logic.
Let us assume that ‘v’ stands for the exclusive disjunction. If this 
is so, the previous exclusive disjunction could be expressed in this way:
 A v B v Γ
But in standard logic we can use brackets in order to separate the 
disjuncts. Thus, the formula could also be expressed as follows:
 A v (B v Γ)
Let us suppose now that A is true. It this is so, B v Γ must be false. 
However, an exclusive disjunction such as the latter can be false in two 
cases:
 -If both B and Γ are true.
 -If both B and Γ are false.
All of this means that the entire formula A v (B v Γ) can be true in 
the case that the disjuncts are all true. As said, If B is true and Γ is also 
true, B v Γ is false. But, if A is true too, A v (B v Γ) is true as well.
This argument seems to be inconsistent with the Stoics’ idea that, 
in an exclusive disjunction with more than two disjuncts, only one of them 
can be true and the others must be false. O’Toole and Jennings22 present 
an interesting discussion in this regard and comment on some possible 
solutions to the problem. In this way, they analyze an alternative form to 
22. Ibidem, pp. 500-503.
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express exclusive disjunctive formulae with three or more disjuncts. That 
form is this one:
 v (A, B, Γ)
Thus, the inconvenience that the use of the brackets causes would 
disappear and it could be claimed that, for the Stoics, the real structure 
of a διεξευγμένον ἀξίωμα (disjunctive proposition) such as ἤτοι A ἢ B ἢ Γ ἢ Δ 
ἢ… is actually:
 ἤτοι… ἢ…(A, B, Γ, Δ,…)
Nevertheless, regardless of this discussion and the thesis that is 
finally accepted by O’Toole and Jennings, I think that the mental models 
theory has the necessary resources to solve the problem of the disjunction 
in Stoic logic, and that, based on the essential theses of that theory, it 
is possible to offer a very simple and easy explanation of the difficulties 
described above. However, before showing how that explanation can be 
drawn from the theses of the mental models theory, it seems opportune to 
expose which such theses are exactly.
4. The mental models theory and the disjunction
The mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird;23 Khemlani & John-
son-Laird;24 Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird;25 Oakhill & Garnham;26 
Orenes & Johnson-Laird27) is a cognitive theory claiming that human re-
23. Johnson-Laird, P. N.: How We Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; John-
son-Laird, P. N.: “Against logical form” in Psychologica Belgica 5(3/4), 2010, pp. 193-221; 
Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Inference with mental models” in Holyoak, K. J. & Morrison, R. G.: 
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 
pp. 134-145.
24. Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Disjunctive illusory inferences and how to elimi-
nate them” in Memory & Cognition 37(5), 2009, pp. 615-623.
25. Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Negation: A theory of its meaning, 
representation, and use” in Journal of Cognitive Psychology 24(5), 2012, pp. 541-559; Khem-
lani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “The negation of conjunctions, conditionals, and 
disjunctions” in Acta Psychologica, 151, 2014, pp. 1-7.
26. Oakhill, J. & Garnham, A. (Eds.): Mental Models in Cognitive Science. Essays in Honour 
of Phil Johnson-Laird. Hove: Psychology Press, 1996.
27. Orenes, I. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: “Logic, models, and paradoxical inferences” in Mind & 
Language 27(4), 2012, pp. 357-377.
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asoning is led by means of semantic and iconic models. The main idea is 
that, when faced to inferences, the human mind considers the possibilities 
that can be linked to each proposition in such inferences. Thus, the con-
clusions are derived or checked by combining those possibilities, admitting 
those that are consistent, and rejecting those that are inconsistent.
However, according to the theory, people do not always note all the 
possibilities, named ‘models’, corresponding to each proposition. There are 
models that are easy to detect, i.e., ‘Mental Models’, and models that are 
hard to identify, i.e., ‘Fully Explicit Models’. The former models require 
little effort to be noted. Nevertheless, the latter models need a great deal 
of thought to be detected. 
The literature on the mental models theory is huge. But, for the 
aims of this paper, only its account of the exclusive disjunction is relevant. 
In this way, it can be said that, following the theory, the Mental Models 
of an exclusive disjunction such as ‘A or B but not both of them’ are these 
ones:
 A
         B
This means that, given an exclusive disjunction, initially, indivi-
duals only note that two scenarios are possible: in one of them, only A 
happens, and, in the other one, only B occurs. Only subsequently, and if 
certain mental effort is made, they realize that those scenarios are incom-
plete and that the actual situations are as follows:
  A (B)
 (A)  B
Where the brackets indicate that the element between them is denied.
These two last models are the Fully Explicit Models of the exclu-
sive disjunction and, ad it can be noted, the information is more complete 
in them. Now, the first one not only indicates that A happens, but also that 
B does not happen. On the other hand, the second one not only shows that 
B occurs, but also that A does not occur.
The proponents of the mental models theory think that this distinc-
tion (Mental Models versus Fully Explicit Models) is always important. 
Nonetheless, it is so especially when an exclusive disjunction has more 
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than two disjuncts. Indeed, if we consider a disjunction such as, for exam-
ple, ‘A or B or Γ’ and interpret it as exclusive, the Mental Models would be:
A
  B
   Γ
 
However, the Fully Explicit Models would include all the possible 
situations for an exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts. That is:
 A  B  Γ
 A (B)  Γ
(A)  B         (Γ)
(A) (B)  Γ
Although the mental models theory does not claim that the human 
mind works by taking the requirements of standard logic into account, as it 
can be checked, these four scenarios match the situations in which, accor-
ding to that logic, the exclusive disjunction is correct. Nevertheless, what 
is really interesting here is that it can be thought that people reason about 
exclusive disjunctions with more than two disjuncts in a natural way by 
considering only their Mental Models. Khemlani and Johnson-Laird28 pro-
ved this idea and stated that it can be predicted that, if individuals must 
make an inference involving an exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts, 
they will usually identify only its Mental Models. Really, Khemlani and 
Johnson-Laird resorted to different reasoning tasks, but any of them can 
be illustrative enough in this regard. One of them is, for example, this one:
Suppose that only one of the following assertions is true:
(1) You have the mints.
(2) You have the gumballs or the lollipops, but not both.
Also, suppose you have the mints. What, if anything, follows? Is it possible that 
you also have either the gumballs or the lollipops? Could you have both?29
28. Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: op. cit., pp. 615-623.
29. Ibidem, p. 618. See also, e.g., López-Astorga, M.: “A formal 
theory can explain disjunctive illusory inferences” in Círculo de Lin-
güística Aplicada a la Comunicación 60, 2014, p. 128.
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It is clear that, according to standard logic, the answer would have 
to be that it does be possible to have, in addition to the mints, the gumballs 
and the lollipops. Besides, that would also be the correct response if the 
Fully Explicit Models were considered. Nonetheless, the answer predicted 
by the mental models theory, and hence by Khemlani and Johnson-Lair-
d,30 is that the participants will tend to conclude that, if the mints are had, 
neither the gumballs nor the lollipops can be had. The reason is obvious: 
as indicated, participants will only detect the Mental Models and, as ex-
plicitly mentioned by Khemlani and Johnson-Laird,31 they will only note 
these three scenarios as possible:
Mints
   Gumballs
         Lollipops
That is, the scenario in which you only have the mints, a scenario 
in which you only have the gumballs, and a scenario in which you only 
have the lollipops.
That prediction was confirmed and their participants significantly 
tended to response as expected by them. But what is truly relevant here is 
that their experimental results can help solve the problem of the disjunc-
tion in Stoic logic.
5. The stoic disjunction and the Mental Models
In my view, the Stoic disjunction is hard to understand for us only 
because we tend to interpret it based on standard logic (in papers such 
as, e.g., that of Bobzien,32 it is also held that this later logic is not the best 
means to analyze the Stoic one). I think that this is the main mistake 
and what actually causes the Stoic disjunction to seem to be unclear. The 
sources commented above raise little doubt: the Stoic disjunction was ex-
30. Ibidem, pp. 615-623.
31. Ibidem, p. 618.
32. Bobzien, S.: “Stoic syllogistic” in Taylor, C. C. W.: Oxford Studies in An-
cient Philosophy. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 134.
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clusive, and it was true if only one of its disjuncts was true, even if it had 
more that two disjuncts.
As shown, this idea is difficult to accept if it is assessed from the 
rules and requirements of standard logic. However, the mental models 
theory offers us the key to understand it. Because it can be thought that 
the human mind usually only identify the Mental Models of the exclusive 
disjunctions with more than two disjuncts (at least this is what Khemla-
ni & Johnson-Laird’s experiments33 demonstrate), it can be claimed that 
that is the natural way in which that kind of disjunction is interpreted by 
people. Thus, from this point of view, it can be stated that the Stoic exclu-
sive disjunction is not the exclusive disjunction of standard logic, but the 
exclusive disjunction such as it is really used by individuals.
Another possibility, of course, could be to think that the Stoics sim-
ply presented a technical definition of the disjunction (see O’Toole and 
Jennings34 for a discussion in this regard), that, according to their defini-
tion, the disjunction was exclusive, and that, nevertheless, that definition 
did not match that of standard logic, but, casually, that corresponding to 
the Mental Models of the mental models theory. In any case, a very im-
portant point is that this later theory reveals us that it is absolutely pos-
sible to consider the disjunction as in Stoic logic, i.e., to be exclusive and, 
at the same time, to be true only when one, and only one, of its disjuncts is 
true, even if it has three disjuncts or more. 
So, based on all of this, it can be said that the διεξευγμένον ἀξίωμα 
was very different from the disjunctive proposition in standard logic. The 
former was essentially exclusive but the relation between its disjuncts was 
not the same as that required by the latter. A διεξευγμένον ἀξίωμα could 
have, for example, three disjuncts and be expressed as follows:
 ἤτοι A ἢ B ἢ Γ
However, that does not mean that the structure of the expressions 
of this kind was equivalent to this one:
 ἤτοι A ἢ (B ἢ Γ)
33. Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.: op. cit., pp. 615-623.
34. O’Toole, R. R. & Jennings, R. E.: op. cit., pp. 500ff.
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Regardless of the fact that brackets do not appear to be appro-
priate in Stoic logic (see O’Toole & Jennings35), that only means that such 
expressions referred to three possible scenarios:
A
  B
   Γ
And, given one of such expressions, only one of these scenarios 
could be considered to be true.
6. Conclusions
The literature on cognitive science shows that the mental models 
theory is able to account for most experimental results in reasoning tasks. 
Undoubtedly, this theory has open important research lines, and, of cour-
se, it can continue to open more of such lines. But something that is very 
relevant about this theory is that provides great doubts that reasoning 
and human inferential activity are actually made in accordance with mo-
dern logic. It reveals that there are other criteria for explaining and even 
predicting the conclusions that people often deduce from several premises. 
In this way, the frameworks presented in the past that appear to be wrong 
because they are incoherent with standard logic can be considered to be, in 
a certain sense, correct from the perspective of the mental models theory.
The problem can be that Greek philosophers and logicians used 
terms similar to those assumed by modern logic, and this fact has led to 
interpret the systems proposed by such philosophers and logicians from 
the point of view of the current logic. Nevertheless, although, as in the 
case of Stoic logic, connectives such as conjunction, disjunction, or the con-
ditional were taken into account in the past, that does not mean that those 
connectives had the same sense or the same meaning as in modern logic 
(as far as this point is concerned, papers such as those of Bobzien36 or 
López-Astorga37 can be very enlightening). In fact, as argued in this paper 
for the case of the Stoic disjunction, it can be thought that there is not a 
35. Ibidem, p. 501.
36. Bobzien, S.: op. cit., p. 134.
37. López-Astorga, M.: op. cit., pp. 1-15.
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real correspondence between the ancient and the modern connectives, and 
that we should not actually require such a correspondence.
For this reason, I think that it can be very useful to resort to 
approaches such as the mental models theory in order to review or rewrite 
the history of logic. This activity can allow us to analyze whether certain 
errors of past logical systems were really errors or they were only a re-
sult of technical definitions or criteria other than the current ones. In any 
event, as shown, a point seems clear: it is not a real problem that, in Stoic 
logic, the disjunction was exclusive and, at the same time, its proponents 
claimed that it was only true when only one of its disjuncts was so, inclu-
ding the cases in which the number of disjuncts was more than two.
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